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Swallowing a World
1
 
―Everyman is me, I am his brother. No man is my 
enemy. I am Everyman and he is in and of me. This 
is my faith, my strength, my deepest hope, and my 
only belief.‖ 
Kenneth 
Patchen
2
 
In this essay, I hope to lend credence to Philippa Foot‘s picture of moral agents as 
―volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and 
oppression.‖3 This is a picture of human beings as volunteers in a struggle against conditions 
hostile to human culture and all the fruits it can bring, cooperating not because of an imperative 
wholly external and otherworldly, but because they cannot meaningfully conceive of themselves 
as separate from this struggle. In developing this picture, I will (i) defend an anti-essentialist 
theory of self; (ii) defend virtue ethics as the best normative ethical view; and (iii) amend the 
traditional Aristotelian ethics of virtue so that it coheres with the anti-essentialist theory of self.  
Part I: The self 
1. Essentialism about selfhood 
 Essentialists about selfhood tend to affirm two theses, one metaphysical and the other 
epistemological: 
Grounding: The self is a metaphysical entity (i) whose persistence conditions do not 
coincide with the persistence conditions of the human being as a biological entity and (ii) 
that grounds and is conceivable prior to all practical and theoretical attitudes and 
activities of a person. 
                                                        
1
 This title is borrowed from a passage in Rushdie, Salman, 1981, Midnight’s Children, Random House, pp. 440-1:  
I am the sum total of everything that went before me, of all I have been seen done, of everything done-to-
me. I am everyone everything whose being-in-the-world affected was affected by mine. I am anything that 
happens after I‘ve gone which would not have happened if I had not come. Nor am I particularly 
exceptional in this matter; each ―I,‖ every one of the now-six-hundred-million-plus of us, contains a similar 
multitude. I repeat for the last time: to understand me, you‘ll have to swallow a world. 
2 Patchen, Kenneth, 1971, Wonderings, New Directions Books. 
3 Foot, Philippa, 1972, ―Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,‖ in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, P. Railton 
(Eds.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches (pp. 313-9), Oxford University Press, p. 
319. 
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Privileged access: A person has absolutely privileged access to her self and can make her 
self intelligible through purely internal process, i.e., without reference to her history, 
surroundings, other people, etc. 
 
Essentialism about selfhood—what John Dewey called ―the belief in the fixity and simplicity of 
the self‖4—can be seen in varying forms in Plato and ―the theologians with their dogma of the 
unity and ready-made completeness of the soul,‖5 but it found its most trenchant formulation in 
the modern period. René Descartes method of radical doubt in Meditations on First Philosophy 
purports to discover the indubitable foundation for philosophy, science, and any kind of human 
psychology or anthropology—the cogito or disengaged thinking subject. For Descartes, 
intelligibility or significance owes itself to the deliverances of a mental process of inspecting 
internal representations and identifying those which carry an intrinsic mark of certitude—the 
clear and distinct ideas. The project of rendering ourselves and our world intelligible is in 
principle an entirely internal enterprise; indeed, without what Charles Taylor calls an ―emphasis 
on radical reflexivity,‖6 Descartes does not think we can safely posit the existence of the kinds of 
entities and relations that an anti-essentialist about selfhood might take as constitutive of the self 
and the consequently the possibility of significance. 
 Edmund Husserl takes himself to be radicalizing the Cartesian project through his method 
of eidetic phenomenology. He calls for an epoché or bracketing of the ―natural attitude‖ through 
which we normally situate ourselves in relation to ourselves and our world in order to establish a 
presuppositionless foundation for human inquiry. By stripping ourselves of the conceptual 
frameworks that usually condition both our theoria and our praxis, we can give pure descriptions 
                                                        
4
 Dewey, John, 1983, ―Human Nature and Conduct,‖ in The Middle Works of John Dewey, Southern Illinois 
University Press, p. 224. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Taylor, Charles, 1989, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Harvard University Press, p. 143. 
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of the essences of phenomena from the perspective of the transcendental ego. Husserl is 
important both for his avowedly essentialist views—the rallying cry of his eidetic 
phenomenology is Zu den Sachen selbst! or ―To the things themselves!‖7 and his method is 
concerned with the intuition of essences—but also because his phenomenological project was 
picked up and transformed into a hermeneutical or interpretive phenomenology by his student 
Martin Heidegger, a notable anti-essentialist who rejected the possibility of a completely pure 
transcendental point of view from which we can still make ourselves intelligible. Before 
discussing Heidegger‘s positive views, as well as those of his anti-essentialist predecessor Hegel, 
I will discuss an anti-essentialist objection to the radical internalism of Descartes and Husserl.  
2. A Nietzschean objection to essentialism 
 With his perspectivism, genealogical approach, and general skepticism about truth and 
knowledge, Friedrich Nietzsche is one of forebears of the anti-essentialist tradition. In the First 
Essay of On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche says 
And just as the common people separates lightning from its flash and takes the latter to be 
a deed, something performed by a subject, which is called lightning, popular morality 
separates strength from the manifestations of strength, as though there were an indifferent 
substratum behind the strong person which had the freedom to manifest strength or not. 
But there is no such substratum; there no ‗being‘ behind the deed, its effect and what 
becomes of it; ‗the doer‘ is invented as an afterthought, —the doing is everything. 
Basically, the common people double a deed; when they see lightning, they make a 
doing-a-deed out of it; they posit the same event, first as cause and then as its effect.
8
  
 
While this passage is ostensibly a rejection of the subject, the claim can be read either 
psychologically or metaphysically. That is, Nietzsche may be positing a kind of psychological 
determinism according to which there is no free will, and hence there are no actions, but only 
events. Indeed, this interpretation is consistent with much of what Nietzsche says; he seems to 
                                                        
7
 Husserl‘s motto suggests an affinity with Immanuel Kant, and it should be noted that though I focus on anti-
essentialism as a reaction against Cartesianism, the two views I hope to reconcile in this essay—anti-essentialism 
about selfhood and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics—can be seen as reactions against some Kantian doctrines. 
8 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1997, On the Genealogy of Morality, Cambridge University Press, p. 26. 
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attribute agency to societal power constructs—most notably ressentiment—and social types—
aristocrat, slave, etc. However, he also attributes responsibility to the ―slaves‖ for subverting the 
aristocratic value system; it did not merely ―grow‖ out of their social type, but was their deed. 
Moreover, such a psychological thesis would seem to undermine Nietzsche‘s project; he wants to 
accomplish a reevaluation of values—an effective reversal of the slave revolt—and speaks to the 
possibility of self-overcoming: tasks which seem to require ―not only subjects of deeds, but even 
possibilities inhering yet unrealized in such subjects.‖9 Indeed, he speaks of expressions of 
strength, rather than mere strength-events, which seems to imply some sort of psychological 
subject. 
 Robert Pippin suggests that ―the doing is everything‖ signals the fundamentality of 
activity in the conception of the subject. He points to a passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 
―Oh, my friend, that your self be in your deed as the mother is in the child—let that be your word 
concerning virtue.‖10 What this passage suggests is that the relation between the self and the deed 
is not one of cause and effect; the self is expressed in the deed, but does not stand behind it as its 
ground. The self cannot be thought of as the ―man behind the curtain.‖ Pippin attributes two 
theses to Nietzsche, which he also finds in Hegel.
11
 
                                                        
9
 Pippin, Robert, 2006, ―Agent and Deed in the Genealogy of Morals,” in K. Ansell-Pearson (Ed.) A Companion to 
Nietzsche, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., p. 376. 
10
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1978, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Penguin Books, p. 96. 
11 C.f. Pippin 2006, p. 380:  
Assume for a moment that there is a brotherhood of modern anti-Cartesians, philosophers united in their 
opposition to metaphysical dualism, to a picture of mind shut up in itself and its own ideas and so in an 
unsolvable skeptical dilemma about the real world, and opposed as well to the notion of autonomous, 
identifiable subjects, whose intentions and acts of willing best identify and explain distinct sorts of events 
in the world, actions. There is a range in such a group, including Nietzsche and Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger, but surely a charter member is Hegel. 
The tenets shared by anti-Cartesians will reappear in relation to the Hegelian and Heideggerian contributions to the 
anti-essentialist conception of the self (in the next section) as well as Wittgensteinian skepticism about mechanisms 
underlying rule-following (in the discussion of anti-theory in ethics in Part III). 
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Non-separability: ―Intention-formation and articulation are always temporally fluid, 
altering and being transformed ―on the go,‖ as it were, as events in a project unfold.‖12 
Non-isolability: ―The conditions under which one would regard an intention as justifying 
an action (or not) have to be part of the picture too, and this shifts our attention the 
person‘s character and then to his life-history and even to this community as a whole or 
to a tradition.‖13 
What these anti-Cartesian theses entail is that subjects cannot be separated from their activity; 
the self is expressed through the deed and evolves with each deed; it is not the deed‘s ground and 
justification. Following Nietzsche, we can say that ―only that which has no history can be 
defined.‖14 The self is only ever manifested in an agent‘s activities, which form a historical 
narrative. We never see a subject separate from activity that is given content by a historical and 
social context; the subject ―behind‖ the deed drops out of all explanation. Rather, we are left with 
a picture of the self as something simultaneously expressed by a person‘s activities and 
constituted by those activities. The Nietzschean critique of the subject externalizes the locus of 
significance; in order for an action to be successful, ―I must be able to ‗see myself in the deed,‘ 
see it as an expression of me (in a sense not restricted to my singular intention), but also such 
that what I understand is being attempted and realized is also what others understand.‖15 
3. Historical anti-essentialists 
 Robert Pippin has argued that Heidegger and Hegel can be viewed as reacting against 
Cartesianism. On Pippin‘s interpretation, Heidegger and Hegel take issue with the following 
Cartesian doctrine: 
                                                        
12
Pippin 2006, p. 381. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Nietzsche 1997, p. 53. 
15
 Pippin 2006, p. 381. 
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Mentalism: ―The world and entities within the world are, originally, significant or 
meaningful only as a result of the occurrence of such subjective states, or of some 
subject‘s intending, or linguistic, or representing, or synthesizing activities.‖16 
Cartesianism, in Pippin‘s sense, encompasses not only Descartes‘ own dualistic views; 
Heidegger and Hegel, Pippin says, ―would regard naturalistic, neuroscientific, and psychologistic 
accounts of such cognitive relations as still Cartesian, even if not wedded to the metaphysics of 
immaterialism.‖17 Mentalism, taken as the claim that the locus of significance of human practice 
is something like internal representative success, ―is still mentalism, no matter what mens is said 
to be made of or how it works.‖18 According to Heidegger and Hegel, the locus of significance is 
essentially social; significance stems from ―a certain network of tasks and functions and I 
understand such a network by appropriately participating in it, not by representing it.‖19 In order 
to support the claim that Heidegger and Hegel were anti-Cartesians, and in so doing lay the 
groundwork for an anti-essentialist theory of self, I will discuss each philosopher in turn. 
 3.1 Heidegger 
According to Heidegger, human selves (or Dasein) can only be understood in terms of 
Being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world is essentially a relational state, but the ‗being-in‘ of 
‗Being-in-the-world‘ does not signal a spatial relation, e.g., when a glass is in a cupboard. This is 
what he calls a ―categorial‖ relationship; it applies only to entities whose Being is not Dasein. 
This type of relationship is found abundantly in the world we encounter, and we can in principle 
give incredibly long descriptions of the relations of an object to its environment based upon such 
a categorial understanding. However, this categorial understanding does not capture the 
relationship that Dasein and the world share. The ‗in‘ of ‗Being-in-the-world‘ does not signify a 
                                                        
16
 Pippin, Robert, 1997, ―On Being Anti-Cartesians: Hegel, Heidegger, Subjectivity, and Sociality,‖ in Idealism as 
Modernism: Hegelian Variations, Cambridge University Press, pp. 375-6. 
17
 Ibid, pp. 375-6. 
18
 Ibid, p. 376. 
19
 Ibid. 
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spatial relationship; rather, it is meant to express an existential relationship. Through an 
etymological analysis of the constituent terms of ‗Being-in-the-world,‘ Heidegger presents the 
state, as a relation between Dasein and the world, as properly understood in the sense of one 
entity ―residing alongside‖ or ―being familiar with‖ another. Even more precisely, it may not be 
appropriate to characterize Dasein‘s Being-in-the-world as one entity (Dasein) residing alongside 
another (the world), for this distinction between entities is somewhat artificial. That is, Dasein 
cannot even be conceived without the world, and the world, from the perspective of Dasein, 
cannot be divested of the marks of Dasein‘s influence. The entities (especially Dasein) are not 
independent and self-enclosed, but are defined relationally. So it is better to understand Being-in-
the-world as a dynamic state, wherein Dasein is absorbed in its environment and each is 
reciprocally affected by the other. For Heidegger, Mentalism cannot be true because ―we are 
simply perfectly capable of moving about within, coping with, dealing with, items and projects 
in the world in a completely unthematic, absorbed way, without first or simultaneously 
representing the world to ourselves as such and such, and without applying rules, calculating 
probabilities, or consulting beliefs.‖20 
The distinction between the categorial and existential readings of ‗being-in‘ may seem 
like a trivial linguistic quibble, but it serves to underscore some important insights about the 
nature of Dasein. The distinction is meant to distance Dasein from other types of entities whose 
Being is merely (i) ready-to-hand or (ii) present-at-hand. When the Being of an entity is ready-
to-hand, it is used as a tool for achieving some end, but is not ―grasped thematically as an 
occurring Thing.‖21 Heidegger‘s paradigm example is a hammer: in our everyday use of 
equipment like a hammer, we do not recognize the hammer as an entity in its own right. Rather, 
                                                        
20
 Pippin 1997, p. 382. 
21
 Heidegger, Martin, 2008, Being and Time, Harper & Row, p. 98. 
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―our concern subordinates itself to the ‗in-order-to‘ which is constitutive for the equipment.‖22 
That is, the hammer is used for its particular usefulness in some project without any regard to its 
ontological status. Heidegger describes our relationship with entities that are merely ready-to-
hand as primordial; it is the manner in which we most often engage with our environment. In 
everyday life, we do not theorize about the ontological status of the objects we encounter; we are 
concerned with them only insofar as they are useful to some project. Entities whose Being is 
present-at-hand, on the other hand, can be the object of theorizing. Entities in the world are not 
typically encountered as present-at-hand; e.g., a hammer only becomes present-at-hand when it 
has failed to serve its purpose (that is, when it has broken). When an entity is encountered as 
present-at-hand, it can be disinterestedly analyzed because it is not an object of (the same kind 
of) concern. 
 So, according to Heidegger, entities in the world are encountered either as existentiala 
(Dasein) or categories (entities which possess either readiness-to-hand or presence-at-hand as 
their type of Being). In discussing Being-in-the-world, Heidegger makes it explicit that Dasein is 
not (typically) encountered categorially: 
The entities which correspond to [the two basic possibilities for characters of Being] 
require different kinds of primary interrogation respectively: an entity is either a ―who‖ 
(existence) or a ―what‖ (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense).23 
This is not to say that regarding Dasein as merely present-at-hand is psychologically impossible, 
or even that it has not been observed as a social phenomenon; historically, this ontological 
miscategorization (whether intentional or not) has been carried out to morally reprehensible 
lengths. So Dasein can in fact be taken as present-at-hand, though it is not the attitude 
                                                        
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid, p. 71. 
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appropriate to its Being. Heidegger further muddies this neat tripartite distinction of types of 
Being: 
Even entities which are not worldless—Dasein itself, for example—are present-at-hand 
‗in‘ the world, or, more exactly, can with some right and within certain limits be taken as 
merely present-at-hand. To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the 
existential state of Being-in. But the fact that ‗Dasein‘ can be taken as something which is 
present-at-hand and just present-at-hand, is not to be confused with a certain way of 
‗presence-at-hand‘ which is Dasein‘s own.24 
 
By the very fact of being embedded in a world, Dasein possesses facticity, which is a type of 
presence-at-hand, albeit one far different from the presence-at-hand of a broken hammer. Dasein 
has a past which is a fact—it is unchangeable and something which it must grapple in 
understanding its Being. As Heidegger puts it, facticity implies that Dasein can ―understand itself 
as bound up in its ‗destiny‘ with the Being of those entities which it encounters in the world.‖ 
According to Heidegger, Dasein understands itself in terms of what it could be. It is never 
content with what it is or has been; rather, its understanding of itself is always ―projected‖ 
towards future possibilities. However, a precondition of this kind of projection is that ―it has in 
each case already been thrown into a world.‖25 Heidegger signals this interconnection between 
Dasein‘s fundamental states (and likewise, the different segments of its history): ―Being-ahead-
of-itself,‖ i.e. projecting future potentialities for its Being, is more precisely ―Being-ahead-of-
itself-in-already-being-in-a-world.‖ In virtue of this, all significance is forward-oriented in the 
same sense as Dasein; something can mean something, or be meaningful, only insofar as it ―has 
been ‗tied up‘ with a ―for-the-sake-of-which.‖‖26 For Heidegger, what all of this amounts to is a 
rejection of the traditional Subject-Object relation. A proper ontological picture of the world is 
not one in which a subject and a world of objects, separate in themselves, have been ―welded 
                                                        
24 Ibid, p. 82. 
25 Ibid, p. 246. 
26
 Ibid, p. 236. 
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together,‖ as Heidegger puts it; rather, Dasein and the world of objects it encounters are woven 
together through care, i.e. Dasein‘s projection of its multitude of potentialities. 
 So care can be given two formulations. In its basic formulation, the concept of care 
indicates that Dasein has a vested interest in the world it encounters; it does not simply 
contemplate the world disinterestedly, but develops projects to realize possibilities from a vast 
array of possibilities. More formally, care is the state of Dasein projecting its future possibilities 
as it is already absorbed in the world and its entities; it means ―Being-ahead-itself-Being-
already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world).‖27 In 
encountering objects categorially, the essential attitude is concern, while in encountering other 
Dasein, the essential attitude is solicitude. Both ontological attitudes are forms of the more basic 
care, and from these basic ontological attitudes derive ontic attitudes like willing, wishing, 
desiring, worry, grief, etc. The crucial point is that, underlying all encounters between Dasein 
and other entities within the world in which Dasein is absorbed, the basic attitude at work is one 
of interest in the actualization of hitherto unactualized possibilities. No matter what projects we 
undertake, i.e., what possibilities we seek to actualize, we comport ourselves in an ontologically 
necessary way towards the entities implicated in those projects. 
 So far I have shown how Dasein‘s understanding is contingent upon two factors: (i) its 
environment and (ii) its concerns. In our environment, we encounter not only entities—tools, 
objects of theorizing, and other selves—but projects (both successful and aborted). Furthermore, 
from the premise that the self is constituted necessarily by its projects, as I sought to show in the 
last section, it follows that all other selves that are encountered in the environment are likewise 
constituted by their projects, and thus will always be encountered in the midst of some project. 
Just as the physical organism of the human being is inconceivable without extension through 
                                                        
27
 Ibid, p. 237. 
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time, so is the human self inconceivable without some kind of narrative cohesion through time. 
Part of this narrative cohesion I characterized in the previous section as the ―for-the-sake-of-
which‖ in virtue of which anything can be significant to Dasein. Therefore, for any non-
solipsistic account, other selves will likewise be encountered as active
28
. 
 Similarly, the world is encountered in terms of ―what is getting done and what is ‗going 
to come of it.‘‖29 In accordance with his reinterpretation of the traditional subject-object 
relationship, Heidegger reconceptualizes history. Rather than being a long chain of experiences 
(a history of the subject) or of motions of objects (a history of the object), history is defined in 
terms of the dynamic state of Being-in-the-world—―Dasein‘s historicality is essentially the 
historicality of the world.‖30 Dasein‘s facticity is predicated on what already exists in the 
world—something which has a long history. However, the ―world-historical‖ is largely defined 
by interaction with and alteration by Dasein; so ―Nature is historical as a countryside, as an area 
that has been colonized or exploited, as a battlefield, or as the site of a cult.‖31 The histories of 
Dasein and the world are mutually dependent; one cannot be conceived of without the other. 
Likewise the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand that are encountered within the world contribute 
to the world-historical and thus to Dasein‘s facticity. The world exists in its present state because 
of a complex history—a story that cannot be told without mention of various entities.  
 Because the self is always already conditioned by its historicality, it must organize this 
historical content, as it were, in order to define itself. That is, in projecting itself into the future, 
                                                        
28
 I mean this principally in an ontological sense. For Heidegger, just as being alone is merely a deficient form of 
Being-in-the-world, since the necessary state of Being-in-the-world is presupposed in any attempt to make sense of 
the ontic state of being alone, attitudes like ―leaving undone, neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest‖ are merely 
deficient modes of concern. C.f. Ibid, p. 83. 
29
 Ibid, p. 440. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
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in order to conceptualize the range of its potentialities, Dasein first ―computes its history.‖32 
Heidegger expresses this project like so: 
So if it wants to come to itself, it must first pull itself together from the dispersion and 
disconnectedness of the very things that have ‗come to pass‘; and because of this, it is 
only then that there at last arises from the horizon of the understanding which belongs to 
inauthentic historicality, the question of how one is to establish a ‗connectedness of 
Dasein if one does so in the sense of ‗Experiences‘ of a subject—Experiences which are 
‗also‘ present-at-hand. The possibility that this horizon for the question should be the 
dominant one is grounded in the irresoluteness which goes to make up the essence of the 
Self‘s in-constancy.33 
 
This picture of the self—as needing to be pulled together from a vast amount of material—is the 
one that I hope to motivate throughout this essay. Heidegger‘s discussions of the meaning of 
Dasein gives a preliminary sketch of ―the Self‘s in-constancy,‖ i.e., its constant redefinition in 
the face of (in both harmony and discord) a shifting world upon which it defines itself. 
Furthermore, Heidegger presents an alternative to Mentalism and consequently an alternative to 
the essentialist self and the conditions for significance entailed by that Cartesian thesis. 
Significance occurs within a network of tasks and practices, not from an individualist perspective 
somehow outside these practices; we can only render ourselves intelligible in terms of this socio-
historical network. Heidegger subverts the Subject-Object relationship that factors so importantly 
in essentialist theories of self and leaves the door open for solipsism; he explains significance 
instead in terms of a vast interconnected network of Subject-Subject relations. 
3.2 Hegel 
Though Hegel is less central to the thesis defended in this essay, many of the anti-
Cartesian themes picked up by Heidegger are anticipated in his work. In the fourth chapter of his 
Phenomenology of Spirit entitled ―Lordship and Bondage,‖ Hegel presents his famed master-
slave dialectic. The master-slave dialectic is an early stage in Hegel‘s dialectical system in the 
                                                        
32
 Ibid, p. 441. 
33
 Ibid, pp. 441-2. 
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Phenomenology. The Phenomenology has been compared to the German bildungsroman—the 
―coming of age tale‖—which follows ―an abstractly conceived protagonist—the bearer of an 
evolving series of ‗shapes of consciousness‘ or the inhabitant of a series of successive 
phenomenal worlds—whose progress and set-backs the reader follows and learns from.‖34 These 
‗shapes of consciousness‘ begin with animal sense-certainty, progress through the creation of 
self-consciousness, the formation of society, and conclude with the attainment of Absolute 
Knowledge. The master-slave dialectic describes the transition from consciousness to self-
consciousness, giving ―the intersubjective conditions which he sees as necessary for any form of 
‗consciousness.‘‖35 
To complete the transition from animal consciousness to the kind of self-consciousness 
distinctive of human beings is to gain a conception of oneself as importantly separate from other 
entities, i.e., to be aware that one‘s animal existence does not exhaust one‘s being, that one 
possesses a self over and above her biological make-up. Hegel rejects the essentialist notion that 
contemplation, understanding, or knowledge affects this transformation; he identifies desire as 
the transformative principle. The act of contemplation is passive, but desire removes man from 
the quietude of knowing, understanding, contemplating, and moves him to action. While 
contemplation leaves its object unscathed, the action that springs from desire is the negation, 
destruction, or at least transformation of its object. That is, desiring X presupposes the lack of X; 
to satisfy my desire for X, I must act on X and change it. I am hungry; the object of my desire—
the food—must be transformed in order to satisfy the desire. Action is negation, and 
transformation is necessarily active. This negation or transformation is not mere destruction, 
                                                        
34
 Redding, Paul, 2010, ―Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,‖ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
35 Ibid. 
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because the ―objective‖ reality is assimilated to the ―subjective‖ reality; the food is external to 
me becomes a part of me, a condition of my continued activity.  
The kind of desire distinctive to self-conscious entities is directed towards the non-
natural—towards desire itself. Here Hegel anticipates Harry Frankfurt‘s definition of 
personhood; for Frankfurt, a person (i.e. a self conscious entity) has second-order volitional 
desires (preferences which move her to action) in addition to first-order desires (e.g. for food).
36
 
Self-consciousness seeks to affect the negation and transformation of itself. The self is always 
becoming; it is never satisfied with remaining constant in its identity. As Heidegger later 
observed, self-conscious entities define themselves temporally; objects and animals are defined 
spatially. The self-conscious I always seeks to be what it is not, i.e., to become. To become is a 
negative act; to be something else in the future involves a transformative act on the material of 
what has been in the past and present. 
If second-order desire is what moves humans to self-consciousness, human reality must 
be social; only in society are there a plurality of desire that serve as the objects of self-conscious 
second-order desires. In order to move beyond the animal herd and become human society, 
humans must direct their desires towards the desires of other humans. For Hegel, this uniquely 
human desire is for the recognition of other self-conscious entities. We want our subjective 
certainty of ourselves to attain the status of objective, i.e., intersubjective reality; ―self-
consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it 
exists only in being acknowledged.‖37 Moreover, the self and the other ―recognize themselves 
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mutually recognizing one another.‖38 Hegel describes the struggle for recognition as a fight to the 
death. However, achieving the death of the other is self-defeating; death is the ―natural negation 
of consciousness,‖ and we can only be recognized and thus have our self-certainty validated by 
another living consciousness.
39
 We want to keep the other alive, but take away his autonomy so 
that our autonomy remains secure; we want to enslave him so that we may unrestrainedly 
crystallize our subjective self-certainty. 
For Hegel, the slave is essentially in a state of becoming, and history cannot progress 
without him. Because the slave must work for the master, he becomes ―master of Nature‖—he 
can transcend the given. In the technical world that he transforms through his work, he is master. 
Historical progress is only achieved through the work of the slave, and through his work he frees 
himself from the master and gains a less immediate, but more liberating mastery. Work is the 
defining characteristic of man beyond animal, i.e., man as becoming. It is this work that both 
humanizes the slave and creates the objective non-natural world—the cultural, historical, human 
world. And it is only in the context of this world that man lives a life separate from his animal 
life and elevates his subjective self-certainty to truth. 
Hegel‘s story of the genesis of self-consciousness is anti-Cartesian in rejecting the notion 
that the self-consciousness is an entirely internal phenomenon. The conflict between the master 
and slave can be understood as that between a system of norms and practices and those who 
work within the bounds of these norms and practices. All progress and indeed, all significance 
(whether linguistic, mental, existential, or whatever), takes as its starting point a certain set of 
norms and practices that are shared by a group of people. It is the ability to adjust these norms 
and practices to our private and public purposes that creates history and creates selves. In the 
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next section, I will discuss how the Hegelian and Heideggerian insights about the essential 
sociality of human selfhood can find expression in a theory of selfhood. 
4. The narrative self 
The anti-Cartesian thought of Heidegger and Hegel goes some way towards refuting the 
pretensions of essentialism and developing an anti-essentialist view of the self. Such a view 
would pay homage to John Dewey's "recognition that selfhood (except as it is incased in a shell 
of routine) is in the process of making, and that any self is capable of including within itself a 
number of inconsistent selves, of unharmonized dispositions."
40
 This is the self that Hesse's 
Harry Haller encounters in Steppenwolf: 
I saw myself for a brief instant as my usual self, except that I looked unusually good-   
humored, bright and laughing. But I had scarcely had time to recognize myself before the 
reflection fell to pieces. A second, a third, a tenth, a twentieth figure sprang from it till 
the whole gigantic mirror was full of nothing but Harrys or bits of him, each of which I 
saw only for the instant of recognition.
41
 
In this section, I will develop a view of selfhood subsumed by the genus anti-essentialism. I will 
call it the narrative view of the self. 
 The narrative self takes as its starting point Heidegger's thought on the "self's 
Inconstancy." The self, according to the narrative view, is something that must be pulled together 
from vast amounts of material: experiences, memories, beliefs, desires (both aborted and 
satisfied), inclinations, plans for the future, etc. Drawing upon Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Hegel's 
externalization of the locus of significance, the narrative view of the self holds that a self is not 
something constructed merely from the inner life of the person whose self it is; intimations of 
selves can be gleaned from an understanding of a person's past experiences, the projects he 
involves himself in, and his future aspirations. Of course, there will be some privileged access to 
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the self from the first-person perspective, but this is only because each person tends to have 
better access to the constitutive material of her own self. As the name suggests, the narrative 
view of selfhood sees the self as akin to a narrative; it is something that is constructed from a 
wide range of material that does not necessary display an internal cohesion. Furthermore, selves 
can be measured in terms of certain standards: consistency, idiosyncrasy, and articulacy. As 
Dewey's recognition seems to suggest, consistency will likely only be partial. Freud has taught 
us to stop thinking of ourselves as having transparent access to the trappings of our minds; it is 
exceedingly likely, on this neo-Freudian picture, that we will have incompatible and delusional 
conceptions of ourselves. 
  Richard Rorty discusses how Nietzsche, Freud, and others have taught us to see the self 
as an ―idiosyncratic lading-list, [one‘s] individual sense of what is possible and important.‖42 In 
so doing, Rorty criticizes the hollowness of the ―I‖ posited by essentialism, who ―give us a mind 
exactly as long as the universe itself, a lading-list which was a copy of the universe‘s own list.‖43 
For Rorty, idiosyncrasy plays the individuating role so conspicuously missing from essentialist 
theories that posit a transcendental ego; it captures ―those particular contingencies which make 
each of us ―I‖ rather than a copy or replica of someone else.‖44Rorty looks to Nietzsche as the 
philosopher who taught us to think of self-realization and self-knowledge on the model of the 
poet rather than of the natural scientist. Nietzsche taught us to see self-knowledge as self-
creation, as a redescription of one‘s past that changes all ‗it was‘ into ‗thus I willed it.‘45 Self-
knowledge is to be conceived not only the model of crossing the boundary between the 
contingencies that every day present themselves to us and atemporal truth that is continuous 
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between persons, but of crossing the boundary between the old and the new—between 
platitudinous ways of describing the raw material that constitutes the self and new, idiosyncratic 
ways of describing it. 
 Self-articulacy is the measure of to what degree one can non-deceptively
46
 and lucidly 
describe one‘s nexus of experiences, memories, relations, etc. as demonstrating a series of 
thematic arcs and reflecting common defining projects. Charles Taylor has argued, pace attempts 
at a naturalistic reduction the self, that we cannot get by in the world without making strong 
qualitative discriminations about what is meaningful or worthwhile—without orienting ourselves 
in moral space, as he puts it. He criticizes theories of selfhood that suppose that the self can be an 
object of study akin to the material of the natural sciences, which fit four criteria: 
1. The object of study is to be taken ―absolutely,‖ that is, not in its meaning for us or any 
other subject, but as it is on its own (―objectively‖). 
2. The object is what it is independent of any descriptions or interpretations offered of it by 
any subjects. 
3. The object can in principle be captured in explicit description. 
4. The object can in principle be described without reference to its surroundings.47 
The self is something that can only be described in thoroughly anthropocentric terms, for it is not 
something that can meaningfully be described in value-free biological or physical terms. While 
non-human animals can idiomatically be said to have a ‗sense of self‘ in the sense of 
apperception or proprioception, they do not share the need to orient themselves in relation to a 
web of questions about the good. According to Taylor, ―we are not selves in the way that we are 
organisms, or we don‘t have selves in the way we have hearts and livers.‖48 Our selves are 
constituted (in part) by our interpretations, and so ―to ask what a person is, in abstraction from 
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his or her self-interpretations, is to ask a fundamentally misguided question, one to which there 
couldn‘t in principle be an answer.‖49 
 Essentialist theories of the self have assumed that, like the subject matter of the natural 
sciences, there is a privileged description of the self—namely, the one generated by the 
individual whose self it is. Not only is the representationalist conception of language implicit in 
the notion of an ‗objective‘ subject matter for scientific contemplation a contestable one; 
Wittgenstein, who attacked this very conception of language, has argued against the possibility 
of a private language in which such an individualistic privileged self-concept could be 
formulated. The language in which we formulate our selves is a shared resource, and there is 
neither a final word on what the uniquely satisfying description of the self is nor a way to take 
off our lexical spectacles, to use Quine‘s phrase, and see what we really are. The narrative view 
agrees with Wilfrid Sellars‘ thesis of Psychological Nominalism 
Psychological Nominalism: ―all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short,    
 all awareness even of particulars—is a linguistic affair‖50 
in regards to awareness of the self; there is no such thing as immediate, non-linguistic awareness 
of the self. It is up for debate whether we can be immediately and non-linguistically aware of the 
material constitutive of the self,
51
 but this material needs to be ―pulled together‖ into a 
thematically coherent narrative in order to constitute a self. The only access we have to the self is 
through our descriptions of it. Taylor points out that the process of becoming more self-articulate 
can never be complete, for descriptions can only be clarified with further descriptions, which are 
by their very nature approximate and depend for significance on the context in which they are 
generated. 
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The process of self-building cannot be finished except by death. Italo Calvino‘s Mr. 
Palomar recognizes this fact: 
A person‘s life consists of a collection of events, the last of which could also change the 
meaning of the whole, not because it counts more than previous ones but because once 
they are included in a life, events are arranged in an order that is not chronological but, 
rather, corresponds to an inner architecture.
52
 
Of course, some people are sadly unconcerned with building an articulate, idiosyncratic self, and 
the task is left to their peers. Jean-Paul Sartre warns against this abandonment of the self-
building project in describing those who fall into bad faith. Nietzsche polemicized the herd 
mentality that believes the self to be ready-made and so leaves its creation to the priestly class or 
the invisible hand of society or whoever, those who fail to realize that ―the horrific struggle to 
establish a human self results in a self is inseparable from that horrific struggle… our endless and 
impossible journey toward home is in fact our home.‖53 From Heidegger and Hegel, we have 
learned that the self cannot exist except in the social, technical human world with a history; from 
20
th
 century linguistic pragmatist philosophers we have learned that this existence is contingent 
upon a shared, but malleable language. And from numerous fiction writers lucidly familiar with 
the state of the human self in the modern age, we have learned how the process of building a self 
resembles that of constructing a narrative. It is an artistic calling, and one which we all share, 
despite the plurality of methods and media we employ. What remains to be developed is how an 
awareness of one‘s own syntax, as it were, ought to illuminate that of others, and so bind us 
together in the ethical life.  
Part II: Virtue 
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 Part II, like Part I, has both a negative and a postive element. In the first section, I present 
G.E.M. Anscombe‘s critique of the normative ethical theories dominant in the modern period 
and her suggestions for a successor vocabulary to that of the modern period. In the second 
section, I discuss eudaimonistic virtue ethics as it has been developed in Aristotle and Alasdair 
MacIntyre. In Part III, I will synthesize the insights from the previous two parts into a coherent 
picture of the ethical self in the postmodern era. 
1. Anscombe and the resurgence of virtue ethics 
 The mid-twentieth century saw the resurgence of a neo-Aristotelian approach to ethics. 
The spark for this resurgence is usually attributed to G.E.M. Anscombe‘s 1958 essay ―Modern 
Moral Philosophy,‖ in which Anscombe defends the controversial thesis that the central concepts 
of moral philosophy are bankrupt and without content. In defending this thesis, Anscombe 
suggests that much of the conceptual apparatus used by modern moral philosophy be dropped 
and replaced with the pre-moral conception of ethics as concerned with the promotion of 
virtuous character that was defended by Aristotle in Nichomachean Ethics. Before giving a 
preliminary definition of the virtues (a task that Anscombe saw as impeded by the lack of proper 
conceptual resources during her time), I will be focusing on Anscombe‘s criticisms of the battery 
of concepts employed by modern moral philosophy and her suggestions for successor concepts. 
 In Anscombe and the subsequent champions of contemporary virtue ethics
54
, we find a 
general strategy of argument: take the most barebones, uncontroversial principles of a 
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contemporary normative ethical theory, examine the use and history of the terms used in these 
principles, and show that they are little more than pseudo-concepts. Anscombe‘s focus is on the 
use of distinctively ―moral‖ uses of terms like ‗ought‘ and ‗wrong.‘ What Anscombe hopes to 
show is that the distinctively ―moral‖ use of these terms is bereft of content because the terms 
have been separated from the historical and philosophical context that made them intelligible. 
Anscombe begins by pointing out that the modern sense of ‗moral‘ was conspicuously lacking in 
Aristotle‘s ethics. In Aristotle, there is a distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. 
Modern moral philosophers might ask whether a failure in regards to an intellectual virtue might 
have moral (in the modern sense) implications. The moral implications of such a failure, 
Anscombe suggests, would be the blameworthiness of the failing agent. But this will not do, for 
it seems that any failure can be arbitrarily blameworthy without the act of blaming having any 
distinctively moral import. For example, it would not be inappropriate to criticize or blame a 
workman for creating a faulty machine, but such reproach would not be required, as the concept 
of a moral failure might suggest. So modern moral philosophy depends on a concept of ―moral 
blameworthiness,‖ which Aristotle lacks; in Aristotle, there are certain mistakes which may 
make man a scoundrel, but it does not follow that the man has a categorical obligation not to 
make such mistakes. For Anscombe, the task is to investigate the demarcation between ethical 
terms in their non-moral and moral senses. 
 The terms ‗should‘ and ‗ought‘ are found in their non-moral senses in everyday speech, 
e.g. in statements like ―If you want to achieve some end ε, then you ought to perform actions x, 
y, and z‖ or ―You should do x to promote your flourishing.‖ However, ‗ought‘ has come to have 
a distinctively moral sense, where it implies some absolute verdict. Sometime between Aristotle 
and the modern day, ‗ought‘ came to have a moral sense in which it was equivalent to ‗is 
26 
 
obliged,‘ ‗is bound,‘ or ‗is required to;‘ it came to be analogous with the ‗ought‘ given by legal 
obligation. Anscombe suggests that this sense of ‗ought‘ is a holdover from the Christian law 
conception of ethics, under which persons had a moral obligation under divine law not to 
perform certain actions. The terms used in Aristotle‘s ethics were transformed to reflect this 
changing conception of ethics: 
In consequence of the dominance of Christianity for many centuries, the concepts of 
being bound, permitted, or excused became deeply embedded in our language and 
thought. The Greek word " ἁμαρτάνειν," the aptest to be turned to that use, acquired the 
sense "sin," from having meant "mistake," "missing the mark," "going wrong." The Latin 
peccatum which roughly corresponded to ἁμαρτημα was even apter for the sense "sin," 
because it was already associated with "culpa"—"guilt"—a juridical notion. The blanket 
term "illicit," "unlawful," meaning much the same as our blanket term "wrong," explains 
itself.
55
 
Anscombe goes on to say that Aristotle did not have a blanket term like ‗illicit‘ or ‗wrong.‘ 
Under his conception of ethics, blanket terms like ‗villain‘ and ‗scoundrel‘ persons, and it would 
be absurd to make such a final verdict on the basis of a single action. The terms he had for 
actions applied to specific deficiencies in virtues, such as ‗unjust‘ and ‗impious,‘ but he lacked 
the moral ‗wrong‘ that we use today. Anscombe suggests that, although we have largely lost the 
conviction that what is needed in order to be a good or bad moral agent is prescribed by divine 
law, the concept of what we ‗ought‘ to do has retained the sense of being bound by law in certain 
contexts. So the concept of moral part of ‗ought,‘ deprived of the context that made it intelligible 
in the first place, is nothing more than a certain emphasis or force added to the non-moral sense 
of ‗ought.‘ 
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 In defending her claim that the moral ‗ought‘ lacks content distinct from that of the non-
moral ‗ought,‘ Anscombe discusses Hume‘s famous is-ought problem. In A Treatise of Human 
Nature, Hume claimed that: 
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that 
the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I 
am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I 
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or 
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be 
observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what 
seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely different from it.
56
 
On the traditional reading of this passage, Hume‘s claim is that a conclusion about a value 
cannot be inferred from purely factual premises. Anscombe argues that if there is such an ―is-
ought‖ problem, there must also be a problem with the ―is-owes‖ and ―is-needs‖ transitions. But, 
though the transitions are philosophically interesting, they are not problematic in the least. Using 
the Humean distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, Anscombe gives the 
following ―is-owes‖ case: 
Suppose that I say to my grocer ―Truth consists in either relations of ideas, as that 
20s=£1, or matters of fact, as that I ordered potatoes, you supplied them, and you sent me 
a bill.  So it doesn‘t apply to such a proposition as that I owe you such-and-such a sum.‖57 
Since there does not seem prima facie to be any problem with the ―is-owes‖ transition—the 
grocer certainly would not accept this reasoning—there must be something wrong in Hume‘s 
line of reasoning. Anscombe explains the ―is-owes‖ transition through the notion of ―relative 
bruteness.‖ A group of facts such as those given in the example about are brute relative to a 
description like ―X owes Y so much money‖ when, if facts xyz hold, then description A 
generally holds, but xyz‘s obtaining does not necessarily entail A, because there will sometimes 
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be exceptional circumstances that cannot always be theoretically imagined before hand, i.e., 
worked into a factual definition of ‗owes.‘ Furthermore, the further fact that I owe the grocer a 
sum that I have not paid would be brute relative to the description ―I am a bilker,‖ where 
‗bilking‘ is a kind of dishonesty or injustice. Using the apparatus of relative bruteness. 
Anscombe successfully derives evaluative, if not distinctively moral in the modern sense, terms 
from merely factual premises. 
 She likewise gives an explanation of the inference from ‗is‘ statements to ‗needs‘ 
statements. To say that, e.g., a plant needs certain conditions to obtain in its environment is to 
say that it won‘t flourish without those conditions. By enumerating the conditions that actually 
do obtain in the plant‘s environment, one can infer what the plant needs. Alasdair MacIntyre 
makes a similar observation about ―is-ought‖ transitions with functional terms: 
From such factual premises as ‗This watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-
keeping‘ and ‗This watch is too heavy to carry about comfortably,‘ the evaluative 
conclusion validly follows that ‗This is a bad watch.‘ From such factual premises as ‗He 
gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any farmer in the district,‘ ‗He has the most 
effective programme of soil renewal get known‘ and ‘His dairy herd wins all the first 
prizes at the agricultural shows,‘ the evaluative conclusion validly follows that ‗He is a 
good farmer.‘58 
Since ‗watch‘ and ‗farmer‘ are functional concepts, i.e., implicit in the use of the terms is an 
understanding of what it would be for a watch or farmer to work well, there is nothing 
controversial about the inference from factual to evaluative concepts. Hume‘s argument against 
the ―is-ought‖ can only apply to ―is-ought‖ arguments without functional concepts. Since moral 
arguments are supposedly subsumed under this category, MacIntyre argues, Hume and other 
Enlightenment thinkers, who failed to rationally ground morality, must have been working with a 
non-functional concept of persons. This was quite a drastic change from Aristotle‘s ethics, where 
ethics was concerned with the transition from ―man-as-he-happens-to-be‖ to ―man-as-he-could-
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be-if-he-realized-his-essential-nature‖59. That is, Aristotle saw persons qua persons as having a 
telos, just as persons qua a profession have a telos, i.e., a functional definition on the grounds of 
which an evaluative claim can be derived from merely factual premises about the person. 
MacIntyre seems to suggest that such ―is-ought‖ arguments about functional concepts are not 
even enthymematic; the ‗ought‘ statements validly follows from the ‗is‘ premises without the 
supplementation of conditional premises that bridge the gap, so to speak. 
 Upon demonstrating that ―is-ought‖ arguments are no more problematic than ―is-owes‖ 
and ―is-needs‖ arguments, Anscombe suggests that Hume‘s conclusion does apply to moral uses 
of ‗ought.‘ This is because the ‗morally ought‘ lacks content out of the context which gave it 
meaning; it is not even possible to derive ‗morally ought‘ statements from other ‗morally ought‘ 
statements because it is impossible to infer a meaningful conclusion without meaningful 
predicates.‘ Since ‗morally ought‘ has only a psychological effect of adding emphasis to a non-
problematic non-moral use of ‗ought‘ by making the ‗ought‘ seem more pressing and emphatic, 
it lacks content distinct from the non-moral ‗ought‘ and cannot play any significant inferential 
role. In a remark echoing G.E. Moore‘s Open Question Argument, Anscombe suggests that, even 
when there is a verdict on what morally ought to be done, there may still be a verdict on whether 
or not to accept that verdict. That is, for any set of law-like moral principles that would guarantee 
the significance of the moral use of ‗ought,‘ it is always an open question whether or not to 
accept those principles. So those who appeal to the moral, law-like sense of ‗ought,‘ i.e., all 
modern moral philosophers, have no ground to stand on.  
 Anscombe briefly considers possible replacements that the divine law conception of 
ethics, i.e., conceptions of ethics that retain the binding law-like force of obligation in the moral 
use of ‗ought‘ without appeal to God. She considers three candidates. The first candidate is the 
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norms of a society. Anscombe rejects this candidate on the grounds that the fact that a set of 
principles are norms of a society to not suffice to give the law meaning to ‗ought;‘ whether this 
happens must depend on the content of the norms, and she believes it appropriate to exercise 
some Socratic doubt about whether the norms of a society lead to good. She likewise rejects the 
idea that a law conception of ethics can be salvaged by an appeal to contractualism on the basis 
that contracts cannot secure all the particularities that we want in a system of ethics and that 
contracts cannot be made without the explicit consent of all those bound by the contract. The last 
candidate for a replacement to the divine law conception of ethics is a neo-Aristotelian concept 
of the norms of human virtue. Just as there are certain norms about what the right number of 
teeth a person should have, where the number is a balance between different extremes, so can 
persons as such be evaluated on the basis of such virtues. Under this concept of norms, a good 
person will be a person with the relevant virtues because having such virtues is conducive to 
their flourishing. The neo-Aristotelian notion of ―norms‖ does not retain the emphatic sense of 
being bound that is found in law conceptions of ethics.  Anscombe suggests that Aristotle‘s 
virtue vocabulary can be a successor to empty statements about the emphatic moral ‗ought‘ and 
‗wrong.‘  She claims that it would be a significant improvement if ―bad‖ actions were evaluated 
as ‗untruthful,‘ ‗unchaste,‘ ‗unjust,‘ etc. instead of as ‗morally wrong‘ because, given a sufficient 
theory of motivation, the virtues can be given uncontroversial factual definitions; therefore, the 
application of a predicate regarding the failure in a virtue will have a definite factual significance 
instead of an ―emotive‖ or ―psychological‖ significance. In the interest of promoting virtue 
vocabulary as a successor to modern moral vocabulary, I will now turn to two positive virtue 
ethical accounts. 
2.     What is virtue? 
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2.1     Aristotle 
Virtue ethics in its classical form was developed by Aristotle in the Nichomachean 
Ethics. For Aristotle, ethics is concerned with the good, but this statement must be qualified. The 
good varies depending upon one‘s interests—―in medicine this is health, in strategy victory, in 
architecture a house, in any other sphere something else‖60. That is, different practices are 
defined by characteristic actions that aim towards certain ends; these ends are the good which 
gives the practice its purpose. But ethics cannot be concerned with just any such end; many ends 
are not final ends, but are chosen as means to a further end. A final end in Aristotle‘s 
terminology is final when it is ―in itself worthy of pursuit.‖ The finality of an end comes in 
degrees; some ends may be pursued only as means to other ends (money, say), some are pursued 
both for their own sakes and for the sake of another end (honor, say), and some ends are pursued 
only for their own sake. This last category of ends Aristotle calls ―final without qualification‖61. 
Ethics, then, is concerned with the end (or good) which is final without qualification. He 
suggests that happiness fits such a role; happiness ―is something final and self-sufficient, and is 
the end of action‖62. 
Happiness is a central concept in Aristotle‘s virtue ethics, but it is also prone to 
misinterpretation. The Greek εὐδαιμονία or eudaimonia has been variously translated as 
‗happiness,‘ ‗flourishing,‘ and ‗well-being.‘ ‗Happiness‘ is a problematic translation because it 
suggests a subjective state about which any agent could not be mistaken. A virtue ethicist may 
meet a hedonist who claims to be happy and would have no ground to contradict him. However, 
the virtue ethicist would not concede that the hedonist is thereby eudaimon. Eudaimonia is not 
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defined by the degree of physical or psychological comfort or pleasure that an agent enjoys. 
Rather, eudaimonia is an externally determinable state; it is the state of living well as a human 
being. ‗Flourishing‘ better captures this aspect of ‗eudaimonia.‘ But since animals can flourish 
by the standards of their species, ‗human flourishing‘ best translate the notion of an objective 
state of living well as a human being.  
Just as the good is relative to different practices, living well is relative to function. To 
determine whether a carpenter or a flautist is performing her role well, one has to appeal to the 
standards characteristic of that trade. These standards derive from the function of the role. It is 
not appropriate to fault a carpenter qua carpenter for a poor embouchure or to fault a flautist qua 
flautist for shoddy craftsmanship. Moreover, each tradesperson can be measured against the 
standards characteristic of their trade by non-professionals (though perhaps with less subtlety 
than others of the some trade). Similarly, parts of the body are said to perform well or badly 
based upon their characteristic function in the organism. In order to determine the final end 
without qualification of human action, Aristotle considers what might be the characteristic 
function of humans. This function cannot be mere survival and growth, for these functions are 
shared with plants, or these functions plus perception, for these functions are shared with non-
human animals. The characteristic function by which the concept of flourishing gains 
significance in humans must then be a kind of life lived in accordance with a rational principle. 
For Aristotle, ―human good turns out to be activity of soul exhibiting excellence‖63. So the final 
good for humans is eudaimonia, which is functionally defined as a life lived in accordance with 
certain excellences. Whether a person attains this good is judged on the basis of a complete life: 
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―for one swallow does not make a summer; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a 
man blessed and happy‖64. 
The excellences to which Aristotle appeals in his definition of ―the good life‖ are the 
virtues. Aristotle divides the virtues into two categories: the moral and the intellectual. The 
intellectual virtues are developed by teaching and are the capacities by which one determines the 
moral virtues. Moral virtues are character traits that are developed by habit; we are born with the 
capacity for moral virtue, but we only become truly virtuous by conditioning ourselves to choose 
virtuous actions where we might naturally have chosen vicious ones. Virtues are states of 
character, rather than passions or faculties, where states of character are the ―things in virtue of 
which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions‖65. Virtues cannot be passions 
because, as we have seen, a person cannot be judged virtuous on the basis of one action. Virtues 
cannot be faculties because they are inborn and virtue is something to be learned. Virtues must 
then be states of character, i.e., character traits that describe our tendencies towards actions that 
display different passions in relevant circumstances. 
Of the intellectual virtues, phronesis or practical wisdom is the most instrumental in 
one‘s leading a virtuous life. According to Aristotle, practical wisdom is ―a true and reasoned 
state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man‖66. Practical 
wisdom is, in short, an ability to determine what course of action will in particular circumstances 
secure the good for the person acting. What  constitutes an excess, defect, or its intermediate 
vary depending upon the agent and her circumstances; practical wisdom is the intellectual 
capacity by which one determines what is the appropriate course of action, from the perspective 
of the virtuous life, given the vicissitudes of concrete cases. As an intellectual virtue, practical 
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wisdom is not something that is inborn, but rather something that must be learned by moral 
education and experience in moral deliberation. Practical wisdom distinguishes those that 
possess natural virtues from those that possess virtues in the governing sense. Aristotle admits 
that there are those who are naturally disposed to act in accordance with virtue, but in order for 
them to be virtuous in the governing sense, they must have practical wisdom. Put another way, 
―virtue is not just an active condition in accord with right reason, but one that involves right 
reason, and practical judgment is right reason concerning such matters‖67. Practical wisdom 
galvanizes the link between one‘s intentions to act in accordance with virtue and their actually 
doing so. A child may be naturally disposed to be kind, but lacking practical wisdom, might be 
kind to a person who would benefit more from brutal honesty in a particular situation. So too 
might someone act courageously to bad ends, e.g., in fearlessly pulling off a bank heist. There is 
an intimate connection between one‘s dispositions to act and intentions in so acting and the 
reasoned capacity that determines when these dispositions and intentions constitute virtues in the 
governing sense. Rosalind Hursthouse points out that the situational appreciation characteristic 
of practical wisdom involves seeing certain facts of a situation as more salient than others. So for 
example an adolescent lacking in practical wisdom but with a natural disposition to act kindly 
might ―still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in 
importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice‖68. Such a situational appreciation is 
something that comes with life experience, including familiarity with the intricacies of human 
interaction, and because of the great variety of virtue-relevant situations with which we are 
presented, there is no helpful way to distill practical wisdom into a set of deontological rules that 
can be memorized and systematically applied. 
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Alasdair MacIntyre makes a number of helpful observations about Aristotle‘s ethics that 
help bridge the gap between classical and contemporary formulations of the theory. He points 
out that ―there is relatively little mention of rules anywhere in the Ethics‖69. He suggests that our 
surprise at this fact owes to the differences between modern society and ancient Athenian 
society. In Aristotle‘s Athens, there was little distinction between the subject matter of ethics and 
that of law. It was the law‘s job to give rules, but these rules were only to apply to those whose 
vices were intolerably destructive to the shared ends of the polis. So a lack in virtue that renders 
one inefficient or useless in such shared ends would be deserving of ridicule of one‘s character—
deprecations like ‗scoundrel‘ and ‗villain‘—but only when one‘s vices became affront to the 
community project would it merit the intervention of the law, which was rule based. In the 
modern age, due to the popularity of liberal individualist theories of societal relations, we have 
largely lost this concept of shared ends. Moreover, Philippa Foot (in her critique of 
consequentialism) suggests that ethics (and in particular an ethics of virtue) can get along fine 
without positing such shared ends; this point will be taken up later in the essay in connection 
with my notion of pluralistic teleology. MacIntyre accuses Aristotle of a sort of historical 
shortsightedness; he fails to see how his particular account of the virtues is grounded in the 
nature of the Athenian city-state, which involves reprehensible defenses of xenophobia and 
slavery. MacIntyre suggests three problems in Aristotle with which an acceptable contemporary 
neo-Aristotelian account of virtue ethics must grapple: (i) defining the telos of human life 
without appeal to Aristotle‘s unacceptable metaphysical biology, (ii) making the definition of 
virtues sufficiently general and flexible that they can be applied to societies other than ancient 
Athens, and (iii) rejecting Aristotle‘s concept of the unity of the virtues. The problem of the unity 
of the virtues is this: if the virtues form a ―simple, coherent, hierarchical unity,‖ how can conflict 
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arise? Aristotle, who borrowed the notion of the unity of the virtues from Plato, explains any 
such conflict in terms of character flaws. MacIntyre thinks that a contemporary virtue ethical 
theory needs to take into account the kind of tragedy inherent in life, the artistic representation of 
which Nietzsche praised in The Birth of Tragedy, to explain how a diversity of values and 
circumstances can lead to conflict that do not necessarily constitute a denunciation of one‘s 
character. MacIntyre‘s solutions to these problems will be handled in the following section. 
2.2     MacIntyre 
MacIntyre‘s account of the virtues starts from the fact that throughout history there have 
been numerous seemingly incompatible definitions and hierarchies of virtue. The central 
question of his account is whether these different conceptions of virtue can be seen as forming a 
unified history, or whether different virtue theorists were in fact working with entirely different 
concepts with some terminological coincidence. MacIntyre considers five historical models of 
the virtues: the Homeric model, the Aristotelian model, the New Testament model, Benjamin 
Franklin‘s model, and Jane Austen‘s model. Under the Homeric model is perhaps the furthest 
from our modern conception of virtue; physical strength factors in as one of the chief human 
excellences. The New Testament model was an effective reversal of many of the Homeric and 
Aristotelian virtues; humility and meekness factor in as virtues, and what were once virtues—
magnanimity and physical strength—become vices. Another interesting point of departure 
between the classical theory of the virtues and the New Testament model was the availability of 
virtue to slaves. As we have already seen, Aristotle‘s virtues were available only to those 
considered a part of the polis, i.e., aristocrats and freemen. Christianity‘s reversal of what was to 
count as a virtue similarly changed what groups were candidates for virtuous living. Nietzsche‘s 
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genealogical account of the slave rebellion in morality coheres nicely with MacIntyre‘s history 
of the virtues. Nietzsche describes how the ―slaves‖ that were to become to the priestly class 
subverted aristocratic values with reference to the ―thin‖ evaluative concepts of good-bad and 
good-evil. MacIntyre, without the vitriol that pervades Nietzsche‘s genealogy, similarly shows 
how the interests of a specific societal group at a specific historic period figure in the definition 
of ―thick‖ evaluative concepts like virtue concepts. Benjamin Franklin‘s account of the virtues 
was utilitarian and concerned with advancing one‘s status within the educated classes of 
Philadelphia and Paris, whereas Jane Austen defined the virtues in reference to the civil married 
life of her time. 
What MacIntyre takes these changing concepts of virtue to show is that a definition and 
hierarchy of the virtues is only coherent within a particular social context. Indeed, from a list of 
the virtues of a society at a given time, it seems that one can derive at least a prefatory idea of 
what the interests of that community are. Homeric Greece was a ‗heroic‘ society, Aristotle‘s 
Athens was dominated by politics (in the early sense of things concerning the steady operation of 
the polis), early Christianity was concerned with performing well in the eyes of a judging God, 
and Franklin and Austen‘s societies were characterized by the business of orienting oneself well 
in a socially and ideologically striated society. In order to capture the sense in which the virtues 
are meant to be useful in attaining the social projects characteristic of the society that gives them 
their significance, MacIntyre appeals to the notion of a practice. In MacIntyre‘s special use of the 
term, a practice is  
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying 
to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive 
of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and the 
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.
70
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Examples of practices in MacIntyre‘s sense include the ―arts, sciences, games, politics in the 
Aristotelian sense, [and] the making and sustaining of family life‖71.  MacIntyre‘s definition of a 
practice relies on the distinction between goods external to a practice and goods internal to a 
practice. The first class of goods are ―externally and contingently attached‖ to the practice, such 
as ―prestige, status, and money‖72 Goods internal to a practice can only be had through that 
specific practice and are specifiable and recognizable only through participation in that practice. 
Participation in a practice involves consenting to be held to standards beyond one‘s own. It is, for 
example, not up to me to decide whether I am a good philosopher; I am held to certain standards 
(clarity, rigor, cleverness, attention to detail, etc.) characteristic of the practice in which I 
participate. If I am unable to admit my inadequacy in judging philosophical ability before I have 
the relevant experience and training in the practice, I will likely be unable to succeed and reap 
the internal goods characteristic of philosophy. External goods are such that one person‘s having 
them leaves less for other people; there is only so much prestige, status, and money to be doled 
out. Additionally, one person‘s obtaining an external good is only a good for him and those 
immediately affected by his success in obtaining external goods (family, friends, etc.). Internal 
goods involve competition, but when a member of a practice obtains them, not only she but the 
entire community surrounding the practice benefit. When a philosopher publishes 
groundbreaking results, not only does she obtain the goods internal to the practice of philosophy, 
but the community benefits from the new possibilities of discourse that have been opened to 
them. 
On the basis of this distinction, MacIntyre gives a preliminary definition of virtue: ―A 
virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to 
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achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevent us 
from achieving any such goods.‖73 MacIntyre believes that this definition of virtue (with some 
extra caveats attached) avoids the aforementioned problems in the classical Aristotelian theory 
without sacrificing its basic character. First, MacIntyre‘s account is teleological, in that it posits 
an end to human action and concerns ethics with that end, but it locates this telos at a social 
rather than cosmological level. Secondly, it explains the variance in theories of the virtues along 
geographical and historical axes. Thirdly, MacIntyre‘s account allows for a plurality of different 
and incompatible virtues—a refutation of the Platonic-Aristotelian notion of the unity of the 
virtues. The account remains Aristotelian in its refusal to identity human flourishing with 
hedonistic pleasure; the distinction between internal and external goods is meant to do this work. 
MacIntyre believes that this first pass definition needs to be supplemented by a fuller account of 
the unity of a human life in order to avoid excessive conflict amongst the virtues and satisfying 
explications of the individual virtues. Since I have already provided an account of the unified 
narrative self in the first part of this essay, I will not go into MacIntyre‘s thoughts on this subject 
here. What is important is that MacIntyre has managed to give an account of the virtues that 
captures their appropriateness to specific social and historical contexts. What I will suggest is 
that the context in which we find ourselves, especially upon accepting an anti-essentialist 
narrative view of the self, is one in which virtue discourse would be of great usefulness.  
Part III: Anxious Cosmopolitanism 
 Before developing the main thesis of this essay, it might be helpful to summarize what 
has been established up to this point. Part I set up a contrast between two types of theories of 
selfhood: essentialism and anti-essentialism. I depicted the anti-essentialist tradition in 
contradistinction to the essentialism of Descartes and Husserl as spawning from Hegel‘s account 
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of the advent of self-consciousness and finding its mature expression in Heidegger‘s rejection of 
Cartesianism in Being and Time. Part II presented virtue ethics as a viable alternative to the 
reigning dichotomy of ―modern moral philosophy,‖ one that has seen a resurgence in the 20th 
century. I discussed Aristotle‘s seminal defense of virtue ethics and MacIntyre‘s modern 
adaption of the theory.  
 In Part III, I defend the thesis that the conjunction of these two theories—anti-
essentialism about the self and eudaimonistic normative virtue ethics—offers a compelling 
picture of what it is to live the good life in the ―postmodern‖ era. In order to defend this thesis, I 
will be obliged to adapt Aristotle‘s teleological conception of eudaimonia to cohere with a 
broadly Heideggerian story of what it is to be a self in our age. This project is shared by 
MacIntyre, who sees a number of problematic theses arising from Aristotle‘s lack of insight into 
how the peculiarities of his own historical era affect his conception of what it is to live the good 
life. Part III will be divided into three parts. The first will discuss the desiderata of an adequate 
amendment to the Aristotelian picture for our age. The second will discuss in more detail 
Heidegger‘s early thought on the human with-world. The third and final section will trace the 
connections between the virtue of justice and the personal quest for self-perfection. In these final 
sections, I want to motivate the following points: 
1. Self-perfection (understood in the anti-essentialist sense as a conjunction of 
consistency, articulacy, and idiosyncrasy) is a virtue. (anti-essentialism about 
selfhood) 
2. Justice is a virtue. (virtue ethics) 
3. Aristotle‘s doctrine of the unity of the virtues is false, so self-perfection and justice 
can conflict. (anti-theory in ethics) 
4. There is no fully articulable decision procedure for deciding ethical conflicts. (anti-
theory in ethics) 
5. In general, justice imposes limits on self-perfection, but an ideal balance can only be 
achieved by those with the kind of situational appreciation distinctive of the virtuous 
person. 
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1. Eudaimonia in the postmodern age  
 As discussed in Part II, MacInytre takes issue with Aristotle‘s virtue ethical theory on 
three counts. First, we need to rethink the telos of human life so that it does not presuppose an 
antiquated vitalist biology. More specifically for my purposes, we need to rethink the telos of 
human life so that it respects the seemingly non-teleological nature of our best theory of selfhood 
in the modern era. Though this phrasing rings of paradox, we can retain a loosely teleological 
conception of human flourishing without recourse to metaphysical or theological vitalism or 
determinism as long as we have a sense of our peculiar historical orientation. The importance of 
a historical sense leads into MacIntyre‘s second criticism: that Aristotle fails to account for 
historical variances in the canon of the virtues and their importance in social life. The view 
presented here makes no pretense to universal and ahistorical validity; it is a theory of what it is 
to be a self and what it is to live the good life in our age. It is at least probable that selves and 
human flourishing were very different in, e.g., the Middle Ages, when philosophy and educated 
culture was dominated by a combination of scholasticism and Catholicism. Thirdly, MacIntyre 
criticizes Aristotle‘s theory of the unity of the virtues. The relatively recent movement within 
contemporary ethics of anti-theory in ethics will provide a more radical reading of Aristotle‘s 
thesis of non-codifiability that deals with this issue. 
1.1 Pluralistic teleology 
 
Following MacIntyre‘s relativization of the definition of a virtue to practices, which are 
themselves temporary historical inventions, we can make sense of a eudaimonistic virtue ethics 
without committing ourselves to any one view of what it is flourish as a human being (more 
precisely: as a human self). As we have seen, Aristotle sees ethics as concerned with the 
transition from ―human-as-(s)he-happens-to-be‖ to ―human-as-(s)he-could-be-if-(s)he-realized-
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(his/her)-essential-nature‖74. But the anti-essentialist theory of the self rejects the notion that 
human beings have an essential nature outright. So how are we to reconcile these two views? 
The crucial move is to rethink the notion of the progress towards self-perfection. Instead of 
conceiving as this quest as the movement toward a set goal—the revelation of a human being‘s 
―true‖ or ―essential‖ nature—, we can conceive of it as the movement away from a deceptive, 
inconsistent, commonplace, and inarticulate understanding of oneself. So the eudaimonistic life, 
under this revised understanding, can be provisionally equated with the process of becoming 
ever more articulate about oneself. Ethics then is to be concerned with the transition from 
―human-as-(s)he-happens-to-be‖ to ―human-as-(s)he-could-be-if-…‖ 
―(s)he-were-more-self-articulate‖ 
or 
―(s)he-were-more-idiosyncratic‖ 
or 
―(s)he-were-less-self-deceptive‖ 
or some combination of these states, which occur on a continuum that has no set end-goal. The 
transition with which this revised eudaimonistic virtue ethics concerns itself is an ongoing 
project as described in Part I, a project that can in principle only be terminated by death due to (i) 
the infinite malleability and reinterpretability of the language in which a self must be couched 
and (ii) the dizzying complexity of human ―being-in-the-world.‖ 
 The view of eudaimonia offered here is then pluralistically teleological. It accepts the 
Aristotelian line that there is something attainable for human beings called ‗flourishing‘ which 
involves a transition from their given circumstances, but denies that this transition has a 
universal and determinate end-goal. The pluralistic redefinition of eudaimonia is concerned with 
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the process itself, rather than the goal, since the goal can in principle never be reached. What it is 
for an individual to lead a eudaimonistic life will depend in large part upon her socio-historical 
circumstances and what projects and practices in which she chooses to immerse herself. With 
this amendment, we can retain a eudaimonistic virtue ethics (as opposed to, e.g., a sentimentalist 
view like that of Hume‘s) while holding a view of the self that is attractive and appropriate to our 
historical period. 
 
1.2 Postmodern virtue 
 
In using the admittedly nebulous adjective ‗postmodern‘ to describe our age and the 
virtue associated with it, I mean nothing more than that we inhabit an age that is largely post-
religious. Our age has accepted the Nietzschean dictum that ―God is dead,‖75 not merely in the 
sense that fewer and fewer people profess to believe in the existence of a Supreme Being, but 
more so in the sense that we‘ve come to see the entire question as irrelevant. It is simply not the 
case that we cannot give a coherent ethics without God, and we needn‘t abandon the hope of 
ethical justification for action beyond its having freely been chosen, as Sartre claims in ―The 
Existentialism of Humanism.‖ As I will discuss in the next section, indeterminacy in ethical 
scenarios does not entail that certain ethical concepts can have normative force, as Sartre seems 
to think. As Anscombe and other contemporary virtue ethicists argue, the widespread acceptance 
of Nietzsche‘s dictum makes traditional law ethics incoherent. The canon of virtues needn‘t be 
avowedly atheistic; it should not address the God question at all. As Foot says in ―Virtues and 
Vices,‖ the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas on virtue are ―as useful to the atheist as to the 
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Catholic or other Christian believer.‖76 Similarly, Hursthouse hopes for an ethics that can 
accommodate the differences between theists and atheists (as well as realists and anti-realists). I 
make no pretense of drafting up a complete postmodern canon of the virtues here, but what is of 
the utmost importance is that it does not include exclusivist terminology like Aristotle‘s 
‗barbarian;‘ we want to move from defining virtue not in terms of the Athenian polis, but rather 
in terms of the cosmopolis. Similarly, I follow Lyotard‘s definition of postmodernism as 
―incredulity toward meta-narratives.‖77 An adequate picture of the postmodern human, which I 
suggest synthesizes eudaimonistic virtue ethics with anti-essentialism about selfhood, needn‘t 
posit all-encompassing narratives—―the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the 
emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth,‖78 or what have you—
that define a unified project among all persons. To capture the ethical self in our distinctive age 
is to affirm pluralism without abandoning the possibility of cooperation and normative guidance. 
 
1.3 Anti-theory in ethics 
  
Rosalind Hursthouse describes a number of her fellow contemporary virtue ethicisists, 
including Annette Baier, John McDowell, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Martha Nusbaum, as 
proponents of anti-theory in ethics, which she takes to be the position that virtue ethics does not 
constitute a normative theory, where ‗normative theory‘ is understood as ―a set (possibly one-
membered in the case of utilitarianism) of general principles which provides a decision 
procedure for all questions about how to act morally.‖79 McDowell defends an anti-theory view 
through a discussion of Aristotle‘s Thesis of Non-codifiability (hereafter TNC), which holds that 
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―the best generalizations about how one should behave hold only for the most part,‖ i.e., it 
cannot be expressed in a universal formula or set of rules that applies to all relevantly similar 
particular cases.
80
 One way of thinking about the motivational capacity of virtues is to express 
moral reasoning in the form of a practical syllogism, where the major premise is a universal 
moral formula, the minor premise is some piece of knowledge about the particular case, and the 
conclusion is the prescription to act. McDowell argues that the thought that a moral outlook can 
be codified into a universal formula or set of general principles stems from a widespread 
prejudice about rationality that was attacked by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations. 
Expressing the lesson of Wittgenstein‘s discussion of rule-following, Stanley Cavell writes: 
We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect 
others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this 
projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of 
books of rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same 
projections. That on the whole we do is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and 
feeling, modes of response, sense of humour and of significance and of fulfillment, of 
what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of 
when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whorl of 
organism Wittgenstein calls ―forms of life.‖ Human speech and activity, sanity and 
community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple as 
it is difficult, and as difficult as it is (and because it is) terrifying.
81
 
In short, the lesson is that we should not think of our ability to follow rules (like extending a 
mathematical series, say, or acting virtuously) as owing to some psychological mechanism that 
guarantees that, with the proper attention, we will not err. We should think of rationality and 
rule-following as owing to the convergence of innumerable subjectivities, rather than 
―divination‖ of some externally authoritative objectivity. McDowell urges us to think of the 
rationality required by a moral outlook as an appreciation of salient features of particular 
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circumstances, rather than the concept-application following from some universal and in 
principle articulable knowledge. McDowell‘s theory is aptly labeled ‗anti-theory‘ because it 
involves skepticism about the possibility of giving criteria for properly rational (and in particular, 
moral) action external to appreciation of and interaction in what Wittgenstein called ―forms of 
life.‖  
            After giving up on this picture of rationality, the model of moral reasoning as a practical 
syllogism can be maintained without violating TNC. Instead of the major premise being a piece 
of universal knowledge, it can be thought of as some oretic state, i.e., ―a desire convertible via 
some minor premise into an action;‖ namely, the virtuous person‘s conception of how to live. 
According to TNC, this conception cannot be fully articulated; ―any attempt to capture it in 
words will recapitulate the character of the teaching whereby it might be instilled: 
generalizations will be approximate at best, and explanations will need to be taken with the sort 
of ‗and so on‘ which appeals to the cooperation of a hearer who has cottoned on.‖82 Moral 
education will be concerned with inculcating the kind of oretic state characteristic of those we 
consider virtuous, but as Hursthouse argues, it cannot be taught by memorizing rulebooks. The 
thought that a moral outlook can be codified stems from what McDowell calls ―the avoidance of 
vertigo‖ that motivates pictures of value as somehow external to our practices and authoritative 
over them.
83
 By accepting TNC, we are left to grapple with the ―colossal difficulty of attaining a 
capacity to cope clear-sightedly with the ethical reality which is part of our world,‖ rather than 
the fruitless project of locating value outside our world and practices.
84
  The acceptance of TNC 
brings virtue to the fore in ethics; ethics can no longer be seen as the attempt to discern universal 
rules for ethical action, but rather as the study of certain characters that see the world in a 
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distinctive way. Anti-theory serves as a response to MacIntyre‘s worry about the doctrine of the 
unity of the virtues because it allows that irresolvable moral dilemmas are not inconceivable. As 
Hursthouse suggests, there may be cases where two perfectly virtuous agents ―have the same 
‗moral views about everything, up to and including the view that, in this particular case, neither 
decision is the right one, and hence neither is wrong.‖85 Conflicts between the virtues needn‘t be 
merely apparent, for there is no one decision procedure for producing the good or right action 
that is rationally justifiable external to our very practice of trying to figure it out. 
2. Heidegger and the with-world 
 In order to understand the relationship between the virtues of justice and self-perfection, 
it might be helpful to briefly discuss Heidegger‘s anti-Cartesian, essentially social definition of 
‗world.‘ It is in the context of this world that the quests for self-perfection and for justice either 
cohere or clash. In response to what he saw as Husserl‘s utter failure to diffuse the problem of 
solipsism in Meditation V of Cartesian Meditations, Heidegger argues that other subjects are not 
set out against the brute object of the Cartesian world as res extensa, but are inextricably tied up 
in the network of assignment relations that we encounter in our everydayness. The ‗being-in‘ of 
our ‗being-in-the-world‘ is not only a ‗being-alongside‘ the equipment with which we 
circumspectively concern ourselves; it is a ‗being-with‘ other Dasein who are implicated in the 
referential network generated by these tools and the projects for which they are designed. When 
we encounter the ready-to-hand, ―others for whom the ‗work‘ is destined are ‗encountered 
too.‘‖86 We encounter a triadic involvement relation between the equipment, its intended use, 
and its possible user. Heidegger gives a number of examples of this encounter: 
When, for example, we walk along the edge of a field but ‗outside it,‘ the field shows 
itself as belonging to such-and-such a person, and decently kept up by him; the book we 
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have used was bought at So-and-so‘s shop and given by such-and-such a person, and so 
forth. The boat anchored at the shore is assigned in its Being-in-itself to an acquaintance 
who undertakes voyages with it; but even if it is a ‗boat which is strange to us,‘ it is still 
indicative of Others.
87
  
For Heidegger, the problem of solipsism is simply not a metaphysical or epistemological 
problem, because he rejects the very notion of worldhood that sees the world as nothing but an 
extended thing or the sum total of entities. We can make no sense of the entities within the world 
without a vast network of assignment relations that are encountered through concern for our own 
equipment use and solicitude for that of others. The world is essentially a with-world, Being-in 
this world is Being-with, and the other Dasein we encounter within-the-world are Dasein-with. 
 Heidegger goes on to describe our everyday experience of the Other through a 
description of how we comport ourselves to our environment ―proximally and for the most part.‖ 
He claims that for the most part we go about our lives without distinguishing ourselves from the 
others who are encountered in the carrying out of our everyday projects. In perhaps the most 
famous passage of Being and Time, he describes the they-self: 
We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about 
literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the ‗great mass‘ as 
they shrink back; we find ‗shocking‘ what they find shocking. The ―they,‖ which is 
nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of 
everydayness.
88
 
For the most part, we go about our projects in an absorbed and unthematic fashion without 
considering ourselves as essentially separate from the Other and her projects. In fact, in our 
everyday mode of existence, our projects themselves are not distinguished from those of others. 
My project of, e.g., buying a loaf of bread, becomes at the same time the Other‘s project of 
selling me bread. It is only at moments of crisis, when the everyday flow of the ―they‖ has been 
disturbed, that our projects and our selves become conspicuous and are truly at issue for us. 
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3. Justice and cosmopolitanism 
 In the course of my treatment of the ethical self in the postmodern age, I have suggested 
that we can make sense of a eudaimonistic ethics without positing a single ahistorical, 
deterministic, or metaphysical telos for human beings as such. In accordance with this pluralistic 
notion of the telos of human activity, I have provisionally redefined eudaimonia as a process 
through which human selves become ever more articulate and idiosyncratic. I have also 
described through Heidegger‘s discussion of the ―they‖ how our everyday projects for the most 
part intersect with those around us. I now would like to suggest that the project of becoming 
more self-articulate implicates one in the project of becoming more just, and moreover that the 
latter project places limits on the former. 
 In ―Virtues and Vices‖ Philippa Foot says that ―justice, in the wide sense in which it is 
understood in discussions of the cardinal virtues…has to do with that to which someone has a 
right—that which he is owed in respect of non-interference and positive service.‖89 In 
―Utilitarianism and the Virtues,‖ she discusses the various limits set by the requirements of 
justice: 
In the first place there are principles of distributive justice which forbid, on the grounds 
of fairness, the kind of ‗doing good‘ which increases the happiness of rich people at the 
cost of misery to those who are poor. Secondly there are rules such as truth telling which 
cannot be broken wherever and whenever welfare would thereby be increased. Thirdly 
there are considerations about rights, both positive and negative, which limit the action 
which can be taken for the sake of welfare. Justice is primarily concerned with the 
following of certain rules of fairness and honest dealing, and with respecting the 
prohibitions on interference with others, rather than with attachment to any end.
90
 
 
So justice is concerned with non-interference in the projects of others, even when such 
interference would thereby increase the maximum amount of welfare. This ―old‖ notion of 
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justice would therefore be unintelligible in a utilitarian ethics; this underscores the respect in 
which Aristotelian virtue ethics is teleological without being strictly consequentialist. 
 As we have seen in Heidegger, in our everyday absorbed dealings in the world, our 
projects are for the most part not distinguished from those of others. The notion of justice 
therefore has little application in our everyday projects; it is only in moments of crisis, when we 
are presented with the Other in all his alterity, that justice can place legitimate limits on action. 
We have seen in Heidegger and others that selves can only be defined in terms of a network of 
projects and concerns with that exist in both a historical and a social dimension. Any reasons for 
meaningful action—action not taken out of pure caprice but in the interest of self-building—will 
necessarily presuppose the projective care that Heidegger discusses as Dasein‘s unifying 
element. But since we have seen that all of our projects are part of a vast network of equipment, 
assignment relations, persons, and their projects, and are only intelligible in terms of this 
network, our actions can only be meaningful and intelligible with reference to this holistic 
nexus—the with-world.  
 But how are we to mediate between the demands of justice and of self-perfection in 
moments of crisis—when the Other and his projects become obstinate, blocking our own 
progress in self-building? The proper strategy is not to claim, as Aristotle or Kant might, that 
conflicts between different virtues are always merely apparent; after all, as a constitutive part of 
the good life, self-perfection must itself be a virtue. Opposition to this strategy is the root of 
MacIntyre‘s criticism of Aristotle‘s doctrine of the unity of the virtues. Similarly, Rorty warns 
against the ―Platonic attempt to hold reality and justice in a single vision.‖ 91 He argues in 
Contingency, irony, and solidarity that ―one should try to adjure the temptation to tie in one‘s 
moral responsibilities to other people with one‘s relation to whatever idiosyncratic things or 
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persons one loves with all one‘s heart and soul and mind.‖92 Becoming more ethical is not about 
finding some immutable similarity between all moral agents. We have given up on the notion of 
humans having an essential nature; the only thing essential to all human beings is that there is 
nothing essential to any of them. And as anti-theorists, we have given up the hope of finding a 
totally articulable decision procedure for solving such conflicts. The best we have is the 
realization that our projects often intersect, and when they don‘t, we rely upon that Other whose 
projects butt up against ours to have a good enough moral sense to realize that very few of us can 
build the kind of self constitutive of the good life without the non-interference and positive 
service—in a word, justice—of others who are, like us, defined by their ―being-in-the-world.‖ It 
is a precarious balancing act, and one that is wont to cause the kind of anxiety that for Heidegger 
accompanies our coming into authenticity. We do not have ethical rulebooks to help us in our 
task; instead, we have a canon of historically appropriate, malleable virtues and the human 
characters that embody them. It‘s no wonder that the moral exemplars to whom we look for 
guidance also have strong, enviable personalities that they maintain in the face of the harshest 
criticism. And as the lines between societies become ever more blurred, our anxious solicitude 
with the Other must spiral out correspondingly and become an anxious cosmopolitanism, lest we 
give up the Aristotelian promise of the good life. 
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